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Is There a Gender Effect on the Cost of  Bank Financing?1 
Danilo V. Mascia and Stefania P.S. Rossi2 
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Highlights: 
 We explore possible gender discrimination in the cost of bank financing for European SMEs 
utilizing a sample drawn from the ECB SAFE dataset; 
 Our main literature contribution consists of our novel approach that captures discrimination by 
looking at effects determined by variations in leadership gender on the cost of bank credit; 
 Results show that female-led businesses are more likely to face worse price conditions for bank 
financing than male-led counterparts; 
 The evidence highlights the existence of a sort of qualitative premium that firms may gain when 
experiencing a shift from female to male leadership; 
 The paper addresses causality and endogeneity issues. 
Abstract 
In this paper, we address the question of whether the gender of a firm’s leader affects the cost of 
bank funding faced by small and medium enterprises in Europe. Using a large sample of 
observations of non-financial firms, during the years 2009-2013, we empirically test for the 
presence of discrimination, comparing female-led and male-led firms. After controlling for a rich 
set of  variables and addressing potential endogeneity, our results show that i) female-led enterprises 
are more likely to face worse price conditions for bank financing compared to their male-led 
counterparts and, ii) firms whose leadership changes from female to male are more likely to benefit 
from an improvement in interest rate levels. This evidence is robust to different model 
specifications and various methodological approaches. The existence of  such bias in the credit 
markets highlights the need of  policy measures addressing female-led businesses, thus reducing 
their bank financing burdens and enhancing their entrepreneurial opportunities. 
JEL classification: D22, G21, G32, J16 
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1. Introduction and literature review 
The access conditions to a broad range of  financial services, and the level of  the related costs, are 
pivotal to the survival and the development of  firms. Indeed, small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) heavily rely on bank credit as their main source of  financing as they are generally unable 
to access equity markets (Caglayan and Xu, 2016; Inklaar et al., 2015; Kremp and Sevestre, 2013; 
Moro and Fink, 2013; Vermoesen et al., 2013). Therefore, the issue of  credit access is considered 
crucial by policy makers and researchers (Berger and Udell, 2006; Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; 
Kirschenmann, 2016), given that SMEs dominate the business landscape in Europe and are the 
main drivers of  employment, growth, and innovation in the European economy (Degryse and Van 
Cayseele, 2000; De Kok et al., 2011; Ferreira Filipe et al., 2016; Popov and Udell, 2012). In addition, 
it is worth noting that SMEs have a harder time than larger firms in obtaining credit (Beck et al., 
2010). This is mainly due to their intrinsic lack of  ability to produce high quality collateral and a 
lack of  transparency related to their creditworthiness (Cowan et al., 2015; Fredriksson and Moro, 
2014; Öztürk and Mrkaic, 2014; Pigini et al., 2016; Vos et al., 2007). In particular, the availability of  
information is important to banks, as it eases the selection of  the borrowers by reducing moral 
hazard and adverse selection risks (Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger and Udell, 2002; Diamond, 
1984). Moreover, credit obstacles tend to be more severe during times of  financial distress, thus 
leading to the phenomena of  credit rationing and suboptimal lending to SMEs (Agénor and Pereira 
da Silva, 2017; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2015; Popov and Udell, 2012; Popov and Van Horen, 2015; 
Tayler and Zilberman, 2016). 
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A significant body of  the literature underscores that difficulties in access to bank credit can be 
even greater for female-led firms,4 and this, in turn, affects their investment opportunities (World 
Bank, 2011). This branch of  the literature examines such problems from both the demand and the 
supply side. In particular, from the demand side the literature recognizes that female borrowers 
may self-restrain – thus not applying for credit – because women i) tend to be more risk-averse and 
less confident than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), ii) exhibit a lower propensity towards 
indebtedness (Marlow and Carter, 2006), and iii) are more cautious in regards to financial choices 
(Barber and Odean, 2001). From the supply perspective, the literature highlights the existence of  
possible frictions by the lenders against women-led enterprises. As a consequence, female firms 
may face i) higher rates of  rejection (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002), ii) lower credit availability (Bellucci et 
al., 2010), iii) worse price terms and conditions (Coleman, 2000; Alesina et al., 2013). 
Although the literature that scrutinizes the demand side is quite unanimous in recognizing that 
women generally tend to self-restrain, more than men, from applying for credit (among others, see 
Cole and Mehran, 2011; Coleman, 2000; Coleman and Robb, 2009; Moro et. al, 2017; Treichel-
Zimmerman and Scott, 2006), the evidence from the supply side is mixed. For instance, Aristei and 
Gallo (2016) using 28 transitional European countries find signs of  gender-based discrimination 
against female-led firms in terms of  credit access. Bellucci et al. (2010), using Italian data, observe 
that female-owned businesses are disadvantaged vis-à-vis their male counterparts in terms of  
collateral requirements and credit availability. Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) find evidence in support of  
greater rates of  loan denials for female-led firms. In contrast, Asiedu et al. (2012), Blanchflower et 
al. (2003), as well as Moro et al. (2017) indicate that female firms are not discriminated against in 
                                                          
4 Apart from the gender issues in access to credit, there is ample literature in the fields of sociology, psychology, and 
economics that draws attention to the existence of possible gender differences in terms of attitudes towards risk (see, 
for instance, Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Francis et al., 2014; Francis et al., 2015). 
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access to bank credit. Similarly, Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) observe that female-led SMEs 
are treated equally compared to their male counterparts in terms of  loans approval rates. 
It is worth mentioning here that the issue of  gender discrimination is not a novelty in the 
literature, as it has received considerable attention for decades. Indeed, two main types of  
discrimination have been depicted: taste-based or prejudicial discrimination and statistical discrimination. 
The former is not motivated by any economic reason – meaning that female- and male-led firms 
are perfect substitute in terms of  credit risk – but, rather, based on lender preferences and beliefs 
about the gender itself  (Becker, 1957). The latter occurs in situations characterized by imperfect 
information, where the collection of information on the firm’s productivity or creditworthiness is 
difficult and costly to uncover. Therefore, in these circumstances, it is easier to infer the necessary 
information by observable demographic characteristics of individuals – and gender can be one of 
those (Aristei and Gallo, 2016; Bellucci et al., 2010; Blanchard et al., 2008; Moro, 2009).  
 Departing from this literature stream, our contribution is to shed additional light on the 
possible existence of  gender discrimination in the bank credit market in the Euro-area by focusing 
on the change in the cost of  bank financing (i.e., the change in the interest rates and other costs) 
for female- versus male-led firms when the loans files have been approved by the lenders. We 
address this issue by relying on 19,969 observations related to a sample of  SMEs chartered in 11 
Euro-area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) for the period 2009-2013. To this end, we utilize the European 
Central Bank (ECB) Survey on the Access to Finance of  Enterprises (SAFE) dataset. This survey 
provides – on a bi-annual basis since 2009 – comparable, timely, and frequent financial information, 
as well as a series of  firm characteristics about SMEs in the European Union. 
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Specifically, our research relates to the literature that studies the effects of  gender on the cost 
of  financing borne by enterprises. A lack of  consensus in terms of  empirical findings has also 
emerged from this niche of  the literature. For example, Coleman (2000) observes that lenders apply 
higher price conditions to women than men. Muravyev et al. (2009), using the BEEPS Survey on 
a sample of  Western and Eastern transitional European economies, find that female-led firms are 
charged higher interest rates than male-led firms. Alesina et al. (2013), focusing on data about 
Italian firms, investigated the issue as well. After controlling for the structure of  the banking 
industry, the degree of  competition and the presence of  small banks, for which fiduciary and 
personal relationships with the clients matter – thus, possibly favoring female firms – they find that 
women pay higher interest rates within any structure of  the banking industry. In contrast, Francis 
et al. (2013) – based on US data – observe that companies controlled by female CFOs benefit from 
lower prices in their bank funding than their male-CFO controlled counterparts – based on their 
reliability in providing accounting data and their lower default risk. Similarly, Asiedu et al. (2012) 
document that women in the US pay lower interest rates than men. Finally, there is also a series of  
studies that report that female-led enterprises are not discriminated against in terms of  their credit 
price conditions (e.g., Bellucci et al., 2010; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002).  
While those studies investigated the issue of  cost disparities in credit access by focusing on 
either a single country or on a cross-country environment employing different datasets, this paper 
is the first attempt to test for the existence of  gender discrimination by looking at the change in 
the cost of  bank financing utilizing the SAFE. More precisely, our contribution to the literature is 
threefold. First, we examine the impact of  the gender of  the SME’s leadership on the change in 
the cost of  bank financing by employing the comprehensive survey from the European Central 
Bank. Second, and more importantly, we investigate this issue in depth by looking at the effects 
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determined by variations in leadership gender. Third, causality and endogeneity problems are 
properly addressed. 
Hence, the hypotheses we test in this study are two. First, we test whether female-led firms 
perceive a form of  discrimination in price-terms and conditions of  bank financing compared to 
male-led counterparts. 
H1:  Female-led firms are more likely to experience worse price terms and conditions for bank 
financing than their male-led counterparts. 
Second, we investigate whether a change in the leadership gender of  a firm affects the shift in 
the cost of  bank financing faced by the enterprises in our sample. 
H2:  A change in leadership – from male to female (from female to male) – engenders a 
deterioration (an improvement) in price terms and conditions of  bank financing. 
To the best of  our knowledge, the idea to test for such a hypothesis represents an important 
novelty in the literature. In other words, we are able to provide a conclusive test on the existence 
of  possible gender discrimination in bank financing by employing a model that takes into account 
the variations of  the firm leader’s gender over time. 
Although we acknowledge that the SAFE only provides data based on interviews and, as such, 
lacks balance sheet data, we are able – by exploiting the information from the survey – to control 
for an ample series of  firm financial indicators and firm characteristics. Therefore, given the 
information available in our dataset, we try our best to discern from some types of  statistical 
discrimination by controlling for a series of  SMEs characteristics, such as sector of  activity, age, 
size, change in leverage, profit, and credit history, and in collateral or personal guarantees. However, 
we are aware that other possible statistical discrimination stemming from the lender side may be 
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out of  our control as it may result from specific information characterizing the bank-firm 
relationship (e.g., any sort of  risk factors only observable by the bankers). 
Ascertaining a causal relationship between the leader’s gender and the change in the cost of  
bank financing, however, is a demanding task. Indeed, the gender of  the firm leader might not be 
entirely exogenous (inter alia, Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Campbell and Vera, 2010; Pathan and 
Faff, 2013; Liu et al., 2014). Potentially, two sources of  endogeneity may bias our estimates, namely, 
omitted variables and reverse causality. As regards the former, we acknowledge that omitted 
unobservable firm characteristics may have an impact on our estimates. In other words, there could 
be unobservable factors, such as corporate culture, which could simultaneously influence the 
decision regarding the firm leader to be hired, the performance of  the firm, and, as a result, the 
cost of  bank financing. With regards to the latter, instead, this source of  endogeneity may especially 
affect our estimates related to the second hypothesis. Here, the concern arises because the change 
in leadership gender might not be a completely exogenous event. Indeed, because of  their 
peculiarities – that is, higher attendance at boards, better monitoring abilities, greater aptitude in 
solving conflicts (see, for instance, Adams and Ferreira, 2009) – women may be more likely to be 
appointed when firms are in a critical condition (see Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Campbell and Vera, 
2010). To formally address these potential endogeneity issues we employ a variety of  econometric 
techniques such as instrumental variable (IV) methods and two-step system generalized methods 
of  moments (GMM) approach. 
Overall, our results support the existence of  gender differences associated with a change in the 
price conditions of  bank financing faced by female-led enterprises compared to male-led ones. 
This evidence holds for both changes in interest rates and other costs (e.g., fees and commissions). 
Moreover, results are robust to different model specifications and remain statistically significant 
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after correcting for the endogeneity issue. Additionally, our analysis shows that firms whose 
leadership changes from female to male are more likely to benefit from an improvement in interest 
rates. This result still holds when we address the potential reverse causality problem. Interestingly, 
such evidence is not inconsequential as it further proves the existence of gender discrimination 
against female-run businesses in the credit markets. 
The rest of  this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the data and the 
methodology. In Section 3, we discuss the empirical results and provide some additional analyses. 
Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1  Data 
To test our research questions, we use the SAFE,5 which is administrated by the European Central 
Bank and the European Commission and is systematically run every six months involving a limited 
number of  Euro-area countries (i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain).6 Starting in 2009, and on a bi-annual basis, this 
survey gathers information about access to financing for SMEs as well as a series of  firm 
characteristics (e.g., size, age, sector, profit, credit history, and manager’s gender). The firms 
interviewed are non-financial firms; however, enterprises in agriculture, public administration, and 
financial services are intentionally excluded from the survey. The enterprises in the survey are 
randomly chosen from the Dun & Bradstreet Business Register. The related sample is stratified by 
country, firm size, and activity. More specifically, our main analysis relies on 19,969 observations 
                                                          
5 The survey is available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html  
6 The smallest countries (i.e., those that represent less than 3% of the total number of employees in the Euro-area) are 
excluded from the survey, as they would only marginally affect the results. 
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obtained by pooling together 9 waves of the SAFE (i.e., from the 2nd to the 10th wave), related to 
SMEs chartered in 11 Euro-area countries for the period 2009-2013.  
Table 1 shows our sample observations by country, as well as the observations of  female-led 
firms by country, with France, Spain, and Italy displaying the highest numbers. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
Interestingly, the Netherlands has the lowest share of  female-led firms (6% of  the total Dutch 
firms interviewed). In contrast, female-led respondents represent 12.6% of  the total firms 
interviewed in Portugal. Overall, female-led enterprises cover about 11% of  the sample. This very 
low share of  female-led businesses throughout the sample may be explained by the difficulties 
encountered by women in reaching top managerial positions (Bush, 2011; Grosvold, 2011). 
2.2  Dependent variables 
We rely on the information about price terms and conditions of  bank financing provided by the 
respondents to test our hypotheses. In particular, the SAFE collects information on i) the level of  
interest rates, and on ii) the level of  the cost of  financing other than interest rates (e.g., fees and 
commissions).7 
Our dependent variables are qualitative and ordinal and are based on the following question: 
“For each of  the above mentioned terms and conditions, could you please indicate whether they 
increased, remained unchanged, or decreased over the past 6 months?” The answers in the SAFE 
dataset were originally coded 1/2/3 for increased/unchanged/decreased, respectively.8 However, 
we recoded them as 1/2/3, for decreased/unchanged/increased, in order to make our dependent 
                                                          
7 The SAFE also provides information on non-price terms and conditions of bank financing – namely, i) the available 
size of the loan or credit line, ii) the available maturity of the loan, iii) the collateral requirements, and iv) other (e.g., 
loan covenants, required guarantees), which, however, are not the object of our investigation. 
8 Answers coded with 9 (N.A.) were disregarded. 
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variables easier to intuitively interpret. In fact, since the labeling is ordinal, any monotonic 
transformation of  the labels gives an equally valid labeling (Öztürk and Mrkaic, 2014). 
Table 2 shows the observations by manager gender of  the outcomes of  our dependent variables. 
In Panel A, we observe that only 14% of  female-led firms experienced a decrease in the level of  
interest rates, whereas male-led firms benefiting from lower costs of  financing amounted to more 
than 17%. Nonetheless, we find that around 48% of  both male- and female-led firms faced higher 
interest rates during the observed period. In contrast, in Panel B we note that a larger share of  
female-led firms (about 56%) faced higher other costs of  financing (in terms, for example, of  bank 
fees and commissions) compared to male-led counterparts (about only 52%). 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
2.3  Gender dummies 
The survey provides information about the gender of  the owner, director, or CEO of  the firm in 
the 2nd to the 10th waves (i.e., from July 1, 2009, to March 31, 2014).9 This allows us to generate a 
dummy that is the key part of  our empirical analysis. In particular, we create Female that is a 
dichotomous variable equal to one if  the owner/director/CEO of  the firm is female, and zero 
otherwise.  
Additionally, by exploiting the panel structure of  our dataset, we are able to keep track of  
possible changes in management – in terms of  gender – at the firm level. Namely, we capture 
changes in leadership by using the first difference of  our female dummy, that is (Femaleit – Femaleit–
                                                          
9 We exclude from our analysis the first wave of the survey, as the gender information is limited to firms with a unique 
owner. Additionally, although available, we had to exclude the waves from 11 onwards as the information on the 
manager’s gender was no longer collected. 
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1). The possible outcomes of  this first differentiation are three, namely, “–1” if  a firm changed 
from female to male leadership, “0” if  a company did not change its leadership gender, and “+1” 
if  an enterprise changed from male to female leadership. On the basis of  these outcomes, we 
generate two dichotomous variables, namely, Female-to-Male when the first difference is equal to –
1, and Male-to-Female when the first difference is instead equal to +1. It is worth noting that the 
panel structure provided by the SAFE is relatively complex: while the number of observations is 
fairly large, the number of firms that were repeatedly interviewed in more than one wave of the 
survey is very limited due to the random selection process characterizing the survey. Therefore, 
given the unbalanced nature of  our dataset, when first-differencing the female dummy, numerous 
missing values are generated; for this reason, we only obtain 5,915 observations of  Male-to-Female 
and Female-to-Male dummies. 
 
2.4  Econometric strategy and control variables 
As described in Section 1, the aim of our investigation is to provide evidence of possible 
discrimination between female- and male-led firms in the Euro-area credit markets by testing two 
hypotheses.  
To test the first hypothesis (H1), we estimate an ordered logit model, as our dependent variables 
are qualitative and ordinal, and study the impact on the level of the cost of bank financing 
attributable to the manager’s gender. More specifically, we study the probability that a female-led 
firm will report at time t that its bank financing price conditions are in one of  the three classes 
(decreased/unchanged/increased) depicted by our dependent variables. As in Öztürk and Mrkaic 
(2014), this technique allows the use of both continuous and categorical variables as covariates. As 
mentioned earlier, we utilize a sample of 19,969 observations. Calibrated weights are employed to 
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adjust the sample to be representative of  the population from which it is extracted (as in Ferrando 
et al., 2017). Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity as well as clustered at the country-
level to remove possible bias in the estimations. More formally, the general specification of our 
model is the following: 
 
Pr⁡(𝐶𝐵𝐹𝑖𝑡) = 𝐹(⁡𝛼⁡𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑄𝑖𝑡 + ψ𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝐵𝑗𝑡 + 𝜗𝐶𝑗 + 𝜇𝑇𝑡) (1) 
 
where i depicts the firm, j the country, and t the time. The cost of  bank financing (CBF) indicates 
the change in either interest rates or other costs in the past six months. Female is our dummy that 
captures the impact of  the manager’s gender on the change in the bank financing costs. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of  standard firm controls, namely, size, age, and sector; this vector also includes controls 
for public support to SMEs that we employ as supplementary covariates in a test discussed in the 
robustness section of  the paper. 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is a vector of  additional firm controls accounting for the 
respondents’ answers about perceived changes in risk, profitability, and credit history. 𝐾𝑖𝑡 controls 
for some non-price conditions of  bank financing (i.e., available maturity of  the loan and collateral 
requirements). 𝑍𝑗𝑡 is a vector of  macroeconomic controls, namely, GDP growth, rate of  inflation, 
and rate of  unemployment. 𝐵𝑗𝑡⁡is a vector accounting for some banking market indicators invariant 
at the firm level (i.e., non-performing loans over gross loans (NPL ratio), change in the cost of  
credit, market share of  cooperatives, banks’ lending activities (BLS), and the level of  banking 
concentration). 𝐶𝑗 is a vector of  11 country dummies. 𝑇𝑡 controls for the time effects (i.e., the 
survey waves) across the observed period. All variable descriptions and sources are provided in 
detail in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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The coefficient of  interest in our analyses is alpha, which refers to the Female dummy. Our 
hypothesis on the existence of  gender differences would imply a positive alpha. All the controls at 
the firm and country level, together with the dummies accounting for country and time effects, 
should reduce any endogeneity problems which may arise from the data. Specifically, the standard 
firm-specific controls (𝑋𝑖𝑡) should reduce the potential source of  endogeneity by capturing the 
independent impact of  firm-level heterogeneity related to size, age, and sector. The inclusion of  
those variables is aimed at alleviating possible concerns that the variations in the cost of  credit may 
be driven by firm specific characteristics rather than the existence of  gender differences. 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of  the variables employed in our analysis. In particular, 
we observe that micro, small, and medium firms10 account for around 26%, 34%, and 30% of  our 
sample observations, respectively.  
TABLE 3 HERE 
The additional controls (the vector 𝑄𝑖𝑡) for the change in risk, profitability, and creditworthiness 
at the firm level, which all come from the SAFE, are also meant to reduce the effect of  potential 
sources of  bias that could affect our hypotheses. In particular, the variables leverage up and leverage 
down capture how a borrower’s balance sheet affects the cost of  funding. These variables indicate 
whether the debt-to-asset ratios have increased or decreased over the past six months. Using the 
SAFE information, we create these two dummies: leverage up equals one if  the firm declares that 
over the past six months leverage has increased; leverage down equals one if  the firm declares that 
over the past six months leverage has decreased. We expect enterprises that have increased their 
debt-to-assets ratios to be more penalized than those who have reduced their leverage positions 
                                                          
10 We utilize the standard definition of firm size provided by the SAFE and widely employed in the literature (see, for 
instance, Lawless et al., 2015). 
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because of  the implied increase in the level of  risk. The change in profit captures variations in firm 
profitability (i.e., net income after taxes) in the previous six months. We would expect that better 
performing firms could negotiate better terms and conditions for bank credit. Following the same 
procedure as above, we create the two dummies for the change in profit: profit up equals one if  the 
firm declares that over the past six months its profit has increased; and profit down equals one if  the 
firm declares that over the past six months its profit has decreased. Finally, we also control for the 
declared credit history of  the firm.11 We would expect that firms that showed a better 
creditworthiness over time might gain more bargaining power with the banks, thus benefiting from 
more favorable financing costs. Again, we create two dummies for the change in firm credit history: 
creditworthiness up equals one if  the firm declares that over the past six months its creditworthiness 
has increased; and creditworthiness down equals one if  the firm asserts that over the past six months 
its creditworthiness has decreased. However, these dummies do not capture the level of  leverage, 
profitability, and creditworthiness. Instead, they provide information about the perceived change 
from the perspective of  the surveyed firm in the aforementioned measures. Indeed, the use of  
such dummies works well as the dependent variable captures the perceived change in the cost of  
bank financing (rather than the amount itself). An ideal additional control would have been the 
level of  education of  the firm’s leader. Indeed, the ability to run a business, as well as the self-
confidence in managing financial decisions, are likely related to a manager’s skills and education. 
However, the SAFE does not keep track of  such information. 
The vector 𝐾𝑖𝑡 includes some controls for the non-price conditions of  bank financing that we 
think play a key role in determining the cost of  funding for enterprises. Hence, we control for the 
                                                          
11 We acknowledge here that the variable that we use to proxy for the creditworthiness is not an objective measure of 
the firm’s ability to repay loans (i.e., it does not come from the lender side), rather it is the firm’s perception about the 
changes in its credit history.  
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time to maturity of  the bank loans (similarly to Hasan et al., 2016) because we think this may have 
an impact on the price conditions of  bank financing. Specifically, we employ the dummies maturity 
up and maturity down if  the enterprises experienced, respectively, an increase or a decrease in the 
available maturity of  the loan in the past six months. Additionally, we keep track an increase 
(decrease) in the collateral requirements faced by the surveyed firms – in the six months preceding 
the interview – via the dummy collateral up (collateral down). 
The macro vector 𝑍𝑗𝑡 ⁡accounts for the general macroeconomic environment that we believe 
may affect the credit market and the cost of  borrowing. We employ here GDP growth (as in Casey 
and O’Toole, 2014), inflation, and unemployment rates. During a slowdown in the economic cycle, 
ceteris paribus, firms tend to be penalized in terms of  credit conditions when accessing formal credit. 
On the other hand, we expect a positive correlation between the cost of  financing and both 
inflation and unemployment. As the SAFE is conducted on a bi-annual basis, we use, for the macro 
variables, averages of  quarterly data for each survey round (as in Ferrando et al., 2017). In the 
vector 𝐵𝑗𝑡 we include five additional country-level controls, namely, the cost of  borrowing, the 
non-performing loans (NPL) ratio, the market share of  cooperative banks, the bank credit 
standards, and the index of  bank concentration in each country. In particular, we employ the cost 
of  borrowing for loans to non-financial firms, as well as the ratio of  non-performing loans to total 
gross loans, as these might affect the price-terms and conditions adopted by the banks in a given 
country for their customers. As the level of  non-performing loans-to-total gross loans represents 
a measure of  credit risk, we think that firms in countries with increasing NPL ratios may be more 
penalized than those located in safer markets. Our choice to control for the market share of  
cooperative banks follows a discrete branch of  the literature (Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010; 
Catturani et al., 2014), highlighting the role of  cooperatives in increasing credit quantity and quality 
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in areas characterized by higher social capital. In our case, where the share of  cooperative banks is 
higher, we expect a greater likelihood that a firm turns to a cooperative bank, thus benefiting from 
better credit conditions.12 Additionally, we retrieve data regarding the bank credit standards from 
the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), which is run on a quarterly basis on behalf  of  the ECB by the 
national central banks (see, for instance, Moro et al., 2015; Moro et al., 2016; Moro et al., 2017). 
Specifically, we employ information about bank lending activities to enterprises in the previous 
three months as a control for bank propensities to lend.13 We presume that a lower inclination to 
lend – which may lead to excess demand for loans – might then determine a deterioration in the 
bank funding costs borne by the firms. Finally, we use the Herfindahl Index (HI) of  bank 
concentration in each country, as we would expect that the structure of  the banking industry and 
the level of  competition might have an impact on the firm cost for bank financing. 
To check our second hypothesis (H2), we need to exploit the panel structure of  our dataset. The 
panel dimension is crucial for us to investigate whether changes in leadership gender at the firm 
level have an impact on the cost of  bank financing faced by the SMEs in our sample. Specifically, 
we test H2 through the following model: 
 
Pr⁡(𝐶𝐵𝐹𝑖𝑡) = 𝐹(⁡𝜑1(male⁡to⁡female) +⁡𝜑2(female⁡to⁡male) + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑄𝑖𝑡 + ψ𝐾𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿Δ𝑍𝑗 + 𝜃Δ𝐵𝑗 + 𝜗𝐶𝑗 + 𝜇𝑇𝑡) (2) 
 
                                                          
12 Better credit conditions offered by cooperative banks should not surprise us given the mutual nature of such 
organizations. 
13 Since the information on bank credit standards is not available for Finland, for this country we employ the average 
Euro-area index. 
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The variables in this specification – whose vectors are the same as the ones defined for equation 
(1) – are all first-differenced. Moreover, the key variables capture the changes in leadership both 
from male to female and from female to male, as defined in Section 2.3. To test our hypothesis of  
possible discrimination against female-led firms, we expect a positive phi1, thus implying an 
increase in the cost of  funding when firms undergo a change in leadership from male to female. 
In contrast, we anticipate a negative phi2 in a female-to-male change in leadership. Notably, with 
regards to the methodology, when employing this first-differenced model, all firm-fixed effects are 
effectively washed away in the first differencing, which makes our estimates very robust.14 
Moreover, consistent with our previous model, we use cluster (at the country-level) robust standard 
errors to control for possible heteroskedasticity and serial dependence across groups in the error 
structure. 
 
2.5 Causality and endogeneity 
Some contributions in the literature have raised concerns about the potential endogeneity problem 
between the gender of  a firm’s leader and the firm’s performance (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Campbell and Vera, 2010; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Liu et al., 2014). Although we do not directly 
investigate this relationship, we are aware that the change in the cost of  bank financing is likely 
influenced by firm performance. The presence of  this problem may thus affect the interpretation 
of  our inferences. With no attempt to address this endogeneity issue, one cannot provide evidence 
of  a causal relation. To formally address concerns about causality and endogeneity, we use a variety 
of  econometric strategies. 
                                                          
14 Indeed, the model is conceptually similar to a fixed-effect panel model. 
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Starting with H1, we first include in model (1) an interaction term of  the Female dummy with a 
variable accounting for firm performance. The idea is to alleviate concerns that the observed 
variations in the cost of  financing are driven by a deterioration in profit (experienced by a female-
led firm), rather than by the possible discrimination itself.  
The second strategy is based on the use of  an instrumental variable (IV) method. Such 
technique requires the identification of  instruments that satisfy the following two criteria, namely, 
the instruments i) must be correlated with the key explanatory variable, and ii) cannot be correlated 
with the error term. We therefore identify the share of  female employment by sector of  activity 
(i.e., construction, manufacturing, mining, wholesale/retail) as a good instrument for our female 
variable. Such ratios, drawn from Eurostat, are available for each country in our sample and for 
each survey round (i.e., we compute them as averages of  quarterly data). Hence, because Female is 
dichotomous, we employ a dummy endogenous variable model and apply a three-step approach as 
proposed in Wooldridge (2002) and implemented by Berger et al. (2016). This approach implies 
the use of  a probit model for the first step, where we regress our Female dummy on the rate of  
female employment and all the controls from model (1). The fitted value from the first step is then 
used as an instrument in the second stage. Thus, the second step is a regression of  the endogenous 
variable Female on the predicted probability from the first stage and all the controls. Finally, the 
third stage is a regression of  the change in the cost of  bank financing on the predicted value from 
the second stage and all the controls as in model (1). 
In model (2), we deal with the endogeneity problem by employing a two-step system GMM 
approach (Roodman, 2009), as in Liu at al. (2014) and Pathan and Faff  (2013). Indeed, this is a 
suitable method i) to overcome endogeneity issues arising from reverse causality and possible 
unobserved factors, and ii) to cope with the challenge of  identifying proper exogenous instruments 
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for our dummies that capture the change in leadership gender. Similarly to Pathan and Faff  (2013), 
the model now includes one lag of  the dependent variable as an additional regressor. Technically, 
this approach allows us to treat the key dummies and all the explanatory variables as endogenous 
while using their past values as instruments. More specifically, all the explanatory variables are 
treated as endogenous with the exception of  the country-level regressors and time dummies, as in 
Wintoki et al. (2012) and Pathan and Faff  (2013). Finally, we check the validity of  the system GMM 
inferences by accompanying them with two tests that may detect potential misspecification. The 
first is a second order autocorrelation test. Because reliable estimates from system GMM are based 
on the assumption that the model is complete (i.e., a sufficient number of  lags has been included), 
no serial correlation should persist in the error term. The second is the Hansen test of  over 
identifying restrictions. Since the system GMM allows us to use more than one lag of  past values 
as instrumental variables, we need to test the null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid. 
 
3.  Empirical Results 
3.1.  Does female leadership affect the change in the cost of  bank financing? 
3.1.1  Ordered logistic regressions and instrumental variable estimations  
To investigate our hypothesis H1, we employ two main econometric strategies. First, we use an 
ordered logit model. Second, we employ an instrumental variable approach. The empirical results 
are presented in Table 4 where we report the coefficients of  a variety of  specifications related to 
equation (1) for the change in the interest rates (Columns 1–3) and the cost of  financing other than 
interest rates (Columns 4–6). 
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The coefficient of  interest here is the one related to the Female dummy, which captures the 
likelihood that a female-led firm – compared to its male-led counterpart – reports, at time t, that 
its price conditions of  bank funding are in one of  the three classes depicted by the dependent 
variable. A positive coefficient of  this dummy signals that, all else being equal, the female-led firms 
are more likely to experience a deterioration in the cost of  funding than male counterparts.  
Looking at the change in the interest rates, Column (1) reports an ordered logit estimate of  the 
basic model (1). The positive and significant coefficient (at the 5% level) of  the Female dummy 
seems to highlight the presence of  gender disparities in the cost of  bank financing across the 
observed period; that is, female-led firms faced a greater probability than male-led counterparts of  
reporting an increase in the cost of  funding. Because we cannot interpret the magnitude of  the 
ordered logit coefficients,15 we decide to compute the marginal effects. For the sake of  brevity, we 
only focus on our key variable. Specifically, the marginal effects indicate that female-led firms are 
1.2% less likely to experience a decrease in interest rates from the bank, and are 2.6% more likely 
to face an increase in their costs of bank financing compared to their male-led counterparts. 
To alleviate concerns that the observed difference of  the change in interest rates between 
female-led and male-led enterprises is driven by a deterioration of  firm performance – rather than 
a signal of  gender discrimination itself  – we include an interaction term between our Female dummy 
and a variable accounting for the change in firm profitability. More specifically, because the SAFE 
is not linked to the firms’ balance sheet data, we capture the change in a firm’s performance via 
the declared increase in profitability that we proxy via our profit up dummy. The estimates are 
displayed in Column (2). Although the interaction term is not significant – even though the sum 
of  the three coefficients (i.e., Female, profit up, and Female*profit up) is higher than zero – our Female 
                                                          
15 The coefficients from an ordered logit regression cannot be read as normal elasticities like the OLS ones. 
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dummy remains positive and significant. This evidence seems to signal that even when female-led 
firms experience an increase in profit, they are likely to face an increase in interest rates from their 
lenders, thus highlighting a sign of  discrimination. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
Interesting insights come from the signs of  some of  the covariates that are used in the 
estimations as control variables. Starting with the financial firm covariates, the dummy leverage up 
has a positive sign indicating that firms that have increased their leverage over the past six months 
are more likely to face an increase in interest rates from the bank compared to firms that reported 
no change or a decline in their leverage ratios. It is also worth noting that the signs of  creditworthiness 
up and down, as well as profit down, are consistent with our expectations and highly significant. The 
dummies collateral up and down, and maturity down play a significant role as well in determining the 
change in interest rates borne by enterprises. 
Moreover, the coefficients of  the covariates related to the banking system indicators are 
coherent in their signs with the predictions of  the model under investigation. More specifically, we 
detect a negative and highly significant coefficient for the market share of  cooperative banks, which 
suggests that the likelihood that firms may detect an increase in the cost of  funding is lower when 
the market share of  cooperative banks is higher. In other words, where cooperative banks cover an 
important share of  the market, there is a higher likelihood that a firm turns to a cooperative bank, 
thus benefiting from better credit conditions. Consistent with the prediction of  the theory, the 
coefficient of  the cost of  borrowing is positive and highly significant as well, indicating that firms 
are more likely to experience increased financing costs in countries that face positive changes in 
the costs of  borrowing. Additionally, we find that the coefficient of  bank concentration has a 
negative sign, suggesting that firms chartered in more concentrated banking markets are more likely 
23 
 
 
 
 
to experience a decrease in bank financing costs. This result, however, is not a novelty in the 
literature since other contributions have documented similar results explained by the information 
hypothesis (see, for instance, Dell’Ariccia and Marquetz, 2006; Fungáčová et al., 2016; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995). In particular, when the bank credit market is competitive, financial institutions are 
less apt to get information about their customers; therefore they simply charge higher spreads. In 
contrast, when the banking industry is more concentrated, banks have a higher incentive to 
accurately scrutinize their borrowers and create durable businesses, which leads them to decrease 
interest rates – thus favoring the bank’s customers (see, in this regard, Alesina et al., 2013). 
Although the female coefficient in our estimates turns out to be consistently significant, we are 
aware that correlation does not imply a causal relationship. We address this issue by implementing 
a three-step procedure (as in Berger et al., 2016) that includes the use of  an IV technique. When 
implementing the IV method, our sample size decreases to 18,080 observations, as we need to 
exclude 1,889 observations for which the SAFE does not provide information about the 
enterprise’s main activity. 
Following the procedure described in Section 2.5, we report the result of  the final stage of  our 
three-step approach in Column (3). As we observe, the instrumented female variable turns out to 
be positive and highly significant at the 1% level, thus supporting our main finding.16 
As for the change in the cost of  financing other than interest rates (e.g., fees and commissions), 
we perform analogous tests to the ones about the change in interest rates and report the related 
results in Columns 4–6 of  Table 4. Starting with the ordered logit analysis, results in Columns 4–5 
highlight the existence of a positive relation between the Female dummy and the change in the cost 
                                                          
16 Unreported tests show that results from Columns (1) and (2) are confirmed when we run the same ordered logit 
regressions on the sample of 18,080 observations (i.e., the same used for the IV estimates) that we obtained by 
excluding the firms for which we do not have information about their economic activity. 
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of financing other than interest rates. Indeed, the Female dummy is highly significant (at the 1% 
level) in both specifications. Moreover, unreported marginal effects show that female-led firms are 
4.2% (0.4%) more (less) likely to experience an increase in the cost of bank financing other than 
interest rates compared to male-led businesses. Finally, results from Column 6 corroborate the 
existence of a causal effect between gender and the cost of funding when we perform our three-
step IV approach. 
We now offer insights about unreported additional analyses. Since all the specifications based 
on model (1) contain a vector of  country dummies (Cj), one might worry that such an inclusion 
may generate collinearity issues with the vector of  country invariant controls (e.g., macroeconomic 
and banking market variables). Hence, we re-estimated all our regressions without the inclusions 
of  the country dummies. The resulting inferences (not reported here for the sake of  brevity) 
corroborate our previous findings. 
 Furthermore, to overcome the concern that sample-selection might bias our inferences, 
similarly to Moro et al. (2016), we re-estimate our ordered logit models following the Heckman 
(1976) approach.17 Unreported tests indicate that our results are not affected by sample selection 
bias. Finally, as for the IV estimates, our hypothesis that female-led firms are more likely than male-
led ones to experience an increase in the cost of  bank financing is also confirmed when we perform 
panel IV regressions with random effects. 
Overall, our results suggest that female-led firms seem to experience a greater probability of  
facing worse bank financing costs compared to their male-led counterparts. This evidence is 
confirmed even after addressing the causality and endogeneity issue. Hence, our findings provide 
                                                          
17 As a matter of fact, because our original dataset includes 61,657 observations and we conduct our estimates on a 
sub-sample of only 19,969 observations (i.e., those that are not missing the price conditions of bank financing 
information), one might raise concerns that our results could be affected by sample selection bias.  
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support to the theory of  gender discrimination in credit markets and largely corroborate other 
authors’ outcomes (e.g., Alesina et al., 2013; Coleman, 2000; Muravyev et al., 2009). 
 
3.1.2  Robustness checks: controlling for public support and for financial autonomy  
In order to verify the robustness of our results, we provide here also an alternative specification of  
equation (1) that includes as further controls two dummy variables that capture increased or 
decreased levels of  public support.18 In particular, public support up (public support down) is a dummy 
that equals one if  a firm experienced an increase (decrease) in the level of  public financial support, 
and zero otherwise. The inclusion of  these dichotomous variables is aimed at alleviating concerns 
that the observed variations in the cost of  financing are driven by possible government subsidies 
that could be designed by policy makers to correct any failure or bias occurring in credit markets,19 
rather than capturing the effects of  the leader’s gender. 
TABLE 5 HERE  
Table 5 reports the regressions based on model (1) with the inclusion of  the dummies 
accounting for public support, using the various econometric techniques already described. Results 
here seem to corroborate the presence of gender differences in the change of the cost of borrowing. 
Indeed, the coefficient of the Female dummy – which is again the key variable to test our research 
hypothesis – preserves its significance and sign across the various specifications. 
We now repeat the tests performed for Table 5 on a sub-sample of  businesses that have declared 
to be autonomous profit-oriented enterprises, namely, firms that are able to make independent 
                                                          
18 The enterprises were also asked whether they had access to public financial support (including guarantees). 
19 Such as through subsidies aimed at sustaining the start-up or the growth of female-led firms (Gennari and Lotti, 
2013). 
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financial decisions. This means that we are, for instance, excluding subsidiaries and branches from 
our sample because they are not fully financial autonomous. The aim of  this analysis is to address 
concerns that our results are driven by the presence in our sample of  leaders that are not actually 
involved in the financial decision process of  the enterprise. This criterion, which involves a minor 
drop in observations, leads us to a sample of  16,700 observations. Results of  this additional 
robustness check are reported in Table 6, where we observe that the coefficient of  the female 
variable is always significant and positive across the various specifications. This supports the 
previous findings and the presence of  gender bias in the change of  the cost of  bank financing.  
TABLE 6 HERE  
Overall, given the stability of the sign and the significance of the coefficient of the Female 
dummy throughout the several specifications – run by employing different econometric techniques 
and samples – we conclude that the results seem to confirm the existence of gender differences in 
the cost of bank financing that may be motivated by the theory of discrimination. 
 
3.1.3  Additional analyses: cross-county heterogeneity and macroeconomic shocks  
We now exploit the cross-country and the “time” heterogeneity characterizing our dataset. The 
former enables us to verify whether the observed gender discrimination might have different 
intensities according to the predominant culture in each country. The latter, instead, is necessary 
for us to examine whether variations in the macroeconomic conditions over time exert a different 
impact on the change in the cost of  funding experienced by female-led firms. Because we think 
that – among our dependent variables – the change in interest rates is the one more likely to rapidly 
reflect the consequences of  a macroeconomic shock, in this section we decide to focus only on 
this variable. 
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To perform our first test, we split our sample into three clusters according to different levels of  
gender discrimination characterizing the countries under investigation. More precisely, we proxy 
gender discrimination via the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) provided by the World Economic 
Forum. This index seeks to measure aspects of  gender equality across four key areas: health, 
education, economy, and politics. As we believe that discrimination may reflect some cultural 
features of  a country, we employ the GGGI to proxy for the cultural differences emerging across 
our sample. The first cluster includes some “Southern” countries (i.e., Greece, Italy, and Portugal), 
where the GGGI is very low (thus indicating a high level of  gender disparities). The second cluster 
includes four European countries (i.e., Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, hereafter 
the “Germanic” group) that share affinities in language, belonging to the Saxon group, as well as 
in gender equality. Finally, Finland and Ireland (“Northern” countries) are the ones within our 
sample with the highest GGGI and thus characterized by the lowest level of  gender disparity.20 
TABLE 7 HERE 
We run our ordered logit regressions on the different sub-samples described above and compare 
the resulting marginal effects. Results reported in Columns 1–3 of  Table 7 highlight that the Female 
dummy is positive and significant for the first two clusters (i.e., the “Southern” and the “Germanic” 
countries), while no signs of  discrimination seem to emerge from the “Northern” group (i.e., 
Finland and Ireland). More specifically, we observe that the marginal effects of  the Female dummy 
display different intensities according to the cluster under investigation. For instance, for the three 
Southern countries, the marginal effects suggest that female-led firms are 1% less likely to 
experience a decrease in interest rates from banks, and 4.9% more likely to face an increase in their 
                                                          
20 We choose not to include Spain in any of these clusters because although it is culturally more similar to the Southern 
group, its GGGI is higher in magnitude and nearer to the Germanic countries. Similarly, we exclude France because 
although its GGGI is closer to the one characterizing the Southern group, it does not fully share cultural affinities with 
such a cluster of countries. 
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costs of financing compared to their male-led counterparts. Not surprisingly, the likelihood of 
experiencing an increase in the costs of bank financing, instead, is lower for female-led enterprises 
belonging to the group of the four Germanic countries (where gender inequalities are lower than 
in the previous cluster): here, female-led firms are 3.3% more likely to face an increase and 3.6% 
less likely to benefit from a decrease in interest rates. Finally, the non-result emerging from the 
Northern group seems to indicate that female-led firms chartered in these countries are not likely 
to face different price conditions for bank financing compared to male-led ones. In other words, it 
appears very plausible that in countries characterized by lower gender inequalities, female-led 
businesses are much more likely not to experience this form of  discrimination in bank lending. 
Now, we assess whether a couple of  macroeconomics shocks that occurred during the observed 
period affected with different intensity the probability of  female-led firms experiencing variations 
in the cost of  financing compared to male-led firms. To do so, we define – in a similar fashion to 
Ferrando et al. (2017) – two sub-samples that are representative of  the most important events 
characterizing our sample period. We first identify the phase of  the sovereign debt crisis (waves 3, 
4, and 5; i.e., from April 1, 2010 – which is the period during which the sovereign debt crisis spread 
– until September 30, 2011). Second, we capture a period of  expansionary monetary policy in the 
Euro-area that followed the announcement of  the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) 
Program (waves 8, 9, and 10; i.e., from October 1, 2012 until March 31, 2014). Inferences run on 
these two sub-groups are reported in Columns (4) and (5) of  Table 7. The results suggest that 
during the period of  the sovereign debt crisis, female-led firms appear to be more discriminated 
against than male-led firms compared to the period that followed the OMT announcement. Indeed, 
the reported marginal effects highlight that during the sovereign crisis, female-led enterprises were 
4.7% more likely to face an increase in interest rates, compared to male-led ones. Not unexpectedly, 
during the period of  expansionary monetary policy such marginal effect was about 1% lower. This 
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evidence supports the view that credit obstacles tend to be more severe during times of  crises, 
especially penalizing female-led SMEs. 
 
3.2 The effect of a change in the leadership’s gender on the cost of bank financing  
3.2.1 Panel ordered logit estimates 
To test our second hypothesis (H2) we need to exploit the panel structure of our dataset. 
Specifically, this section presents the results of the estimates based on equation (2) where we study, 
via a panel ordered logit model, whether changes in the leadership gender at the firm level have an 
impact on the change in the price terms and conditions of the bank financing faced by the 
enterprises in our sample. The rationale behind our approach is to capture the effect that a change 
in leadership – from female to male or from male to female – may induce on the probability that 
firms face a decrease or an increase in the cost of bank financing. 
As already underlined in Section 2.3, due to the random selection process of  the firms 
interviewed, our dataset is unbalanced; indeed, firms were not always repeatedly interviewed in 
consecutive waves. For this reason, when first-differencing our Female dummy, we register a drop 
in the available observations (from 19,969 to 5,915). Nevertheless, during the observed period, we 
are able to detect a considerable number of  variations in leadership gender, namely, 196 (202) 
changes from a male to a female (from a female to a male) manager.21 
                                                          
21 Note that because of the unbalanced nature of the dataset, some firms may indeed present gaps in the series. 
Therefore, we are able to capture changes in the leadership gender (at the firm level) only among consecutive waves 
of the survey. 
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It is worth noting that because we employ a first-differenced model, all firm-fixed effects are 
effectively washed away, thus making our estimates very robust. The outcome of our investigation 
is reported in Table 8. 
TABLE 8 HERE 
Interestingly, while the variation in leadership from a male to a female manager does not seem 
to affect the change in the cost of the bank financing, we observe that the change from a female 
to a male manager negatively and significantly affects the variation in interest rates. This result 
clearly emerges from Column (1) where our Female-to-Male dummy is significant at the 5% level, 
meaning that firms are more likely to experience a decrease in the level of interest rates when the 
leadership shifts from a female to a male manager. To put it in different words, our evidence 
suggests the presence of a sort of qualitative premium on the cost of funding that the ith firm may gain 
when its leadership changes from female to male. This finding supports, once again, the hypothesis 
of gender-based discrimination that we have investigated in our study. Indeed, a change in firm 
leadership, from a woman to a man, may thus alleviate the loan officers’ concerns and help the 
enterprise benefit from better conditions for bank funding.  
To corroborate our analyses, we then perform two checks. First, we control for the existence of  
possible changes in government subsidies by including specific dummies in Column (2) of  Table 
8. By doing so, we are able to rule out the possibility that the results are capturing the effects of  
higher or lower government support to firms rather than the effect of  a change in leadership 
gender. Here, results confirm the evidence provided in Column (1).  
Second, as a further robustness check, we re-estimate equation (2) by separately including the 
dummies accounting for changes in leadership; namely, we insert our Male-to-Female and Female-to-
Male dummies one by one in our regressions. In this way, we are able to exclude the possibility that 
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our findings are driven by the contemporaneous presence of both dummies. Results are reported 
in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 and turn out to be consistent with the evidence provided earlier. 
Unfortunately, no results seem to emerge when we repeat our analysis for the change in the cost 
of  financing other than interest rates (e.g., fees and commissions). Indeed, the dummies Female-to-
Male and Male-to-Female displayed in Columns 5–8 of  Table 8 do not turn out to be statistically 
significant in any of  the specifications reported. 
 
3.2.2  Dynamic System GMM estimates 
As discussed above in Section 2.5, when dealing with the change in leadership our estimates may 
be affected by a problem of reverse causality. Specifically, the concern arises here because the 
change in the leadership gender might not be fully exogenous. Indeed, because of  their features, 
that is, higher attendance at boards, better monitoring abilities, and greater aptitude in solving 
conflicts (see, for instance, Adams and Ferreira, 2009), women may be more likely to be appointed 
when firms are in critical conditions (see Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Campbell and Vera, 2010).  
To address such concern, we employ a two-step dynamic system GMM approach (Roodman, 
2009), as in Liu et al. (2014) and Pathan and Faff (2013). Since we utilize the lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor, given the unbalanced nature of our dataset, the observations drop to 3,554. 
Table 9 reports the results of our GMM estimates about the effects of a change in leadership gender 
on the declared variations in the level of interest rates.22 The diagnostic tests provided in Table 9 
highlight that the model is properly fitted, with statistically insignificant statistics for both the 
                                                          
22 We disregard the effects of a change in the leadership gender on the other costs of financing because the related 
results in Table 8 were not statistically significant. 
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second-order autocorrelation (i.e., AR(2)) test and the test of over-identifying restrictions (i.e., 
Hansen).23 
TABLE 9 HERE 
Interestingly, the evidence provided here supports the findings obtained with the panel ordered 
logit models displayed in Table 8. The sign of the dummy Female-to-Male is always negative and 
significant. Additionally, the coefficient of the Male-to-Female dummy turns out to be positive and 
mildly significant (at the 10% level) in Column (3) suggesting that, when the leadership changes 
from male to female, firms are likely to face an increase in interest rates. 
Overall, even when correcting our inferences to overcome the potential reverse causality issue, 
results seem to corroborate the existence of a sort of qualitative premium that firms may gain when 
changing from female to male leadership. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
Access to formal credit for SMEs is crucial to their survival, as they have to rely more on bank 
credit than large firms. Once financed, enterprises may experience different price-terms and 
conditions for their funding that vary according to a firm’s creditworthiness, leverage, and 
profitability, among others. Nonetheless, a branch of  the literature highlights the existence of  
possible differences in the price conditions from banks because of  the gender of  a firm’s leader. 
Following the theory of  gender discrimination in credit markets, in this study, we test two 
hypotheses of  gender bias by looking at the change in the cost of  bank financing experienced by 
                                                          
23 The AR(1) test is statistically significant because the residuals in the first difference are serially correlated by way of 
construction. 
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female-led firms versus their male-led counterparts. Our empirical analysis is based on data coming 
from the ECB SAFE conducted on a large sample of  SMEs across 11 European countries during 
the period 2009-2013. 
Our first hypothesis aims at testing whether female-led firms are more likely to face worse price 
terms and conditions of  bank financing (i.e., in terms of  interest rates and other costs) than male-
led counterparts. In order to investigate this research question, we estimate an ordered logit model 
– as our dependent variables are qualitative and ordinal – and study the impact on the cost of  bank 
financing attributable to the manager’s gender. Furthermore, to formally address the causality issue 
we employ instrumental variable regressions. Finally, we run a series of  robustness checks to 
corroborate our findings and also provide additional analyses carried out by exploiting the cross-
country and “time” heterogeneity of  our dataset. 
The second hypothesis, instead, aims at verifying whether changes in leadership gender at the 
firm level have an impact on the change in the cost of  bank financing faced by the enterprises in 
our sample. In other words, to the best of our knowledge this is the first study that explores the 
existence of gender discrimination by looking at changes in leadership gender at SMEs that we 
detected via the panel dimension of the dataset. In particular, after having used the ordered logit 
panel model, we employ a two-step system GMM approach to address the potential reverse 
causality issue that may affect the estimates. 
Our findings show that female-led enterprises face a higher probability of  being confronted 
with worse bank financing costs, as they are more likely to experience an increase in interest rates 
and in other costs than their male-led counterparts. Results turn out to be stable to different model 
specifications and different econometric strategies. Additionally, we also find that firms that 
experience a change in leadership from female to male are more likely to benefit from a decrease 
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in interest rates. Such evidence highlights the existence of a sort of qualitative premium that firms 
may gain when changing from a female to a male leader. Put another way, banks appear more 
inclined to favor firms when they are under the control of a man. This is not inconsequential as it 
further proves the existence of gender discrimination in bank lending. 
With all the caveats of  the empirical investigation, our approach seems to exclude the presence 
of statistical discrimination. Put differently, although we lack objective data from firm balance 
sheets, we try our best to control for a variety of risk factors, including the changes in the 
borrower’s credit history, leverage, and profit, variations in the maturity and collaterals required on 
the loans, as well as for the age, size, and sector in which the SMEs operate. We are also aware that 
any other possible statistical discrimination stemming from the lender side may be out of our 
control as it may result from the specific information characterizing the bank-firm relationship, for 
example, any sort of risk factors only observable by the bankers. Nevertheless, to some extent, we 
are able to exclude that female-led firms pay more because they experience worse performance or 
changes in risk levels. Rather, our findings seem to lean more toward a prejudicial discrimination by 
the lender. We acknowledge, anyway, that prejudicial discrimination is something difficult to detect that 
we may attribute, for instance, to the lender that lacks objective standards when judging female-led 
enterprise applicants. 
At least two explanations can be provided to support our findings. First, we could argue that 
the loan officers may see women as less able to run businesses than men (Alesina et al., 2013). This 
aversion by the lenders, hence, results in worse pricing conditions for the bank loans. Second, 
women may be more likely to experience higher costs of bank financing because of poorer 
bargaining abilities when dealing with bankers (e.g., Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009). A deeper scrutiny of these two explanations would require additional information 
and investigation that are beyond the scope of this study. However, the identification of such biases 
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has important implications for both researchers and policymakers. Indeed, the existence of such 
failures – attributable to both lenders and women – suggests that the adoption of policy measures 
addressing female-led businesses, such as in the form of interest relief, may be crucial in reducing 
the likelihood that such businesses experience worse conditions for bank financing compared to 
male-led enterprises, as well as in enhancing female entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Finally, although our findings are robust, we are aware of the limitations that arise from the use 
of a survey-based dataset without any link to the firm’s financial statements. Furthermore, we are 
conscious that the availability of information on the level of education of the firms’ leaders would 
be an ideal additional asset to enrich our analyses. Addressing such limitations, therefore, may lay 
the groundwork for future research. 
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Table 1: Total observations and Female observations by country 
 
 Total observations Female observations 
Country Name Frequency % (on the full sample) Frequency % (at the country level) 
     
Austria 1,162 5.82 140 12.05 
Belgium 1,078 5.40 119 11.04 
Finland 692 3.47 73 10.55 
France 3,620 18.13 415 11.46 
Germany 2,580 12.92 301 11.67 
Greece 1,059 5.30 92 8.69 
Ireland 920 4.61 97 10.54 
Italy 3,573 17.89 388 10.86 
Netherlands 647 3.24 39 6.03 
Portugal 997 4.99 126 12.64 
Spain 3,641 18.23 400 10.99 
     
Sample mean    11.00 
Total 19,969 100.00 2,190  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Dependent variables – Observations by manager’s gender 
 
Panel A: Level of interest rates 
 Observations 
Manager’s Gender Decreased Unchanged Increased Total 
     
Female 316 815 1,059 2,190 
Male 3,114 5,970 8,695 17,779 
     
Total    19,969 
 
Panel B: Level of the cost of financing (other than interest rates) 
 Observations 
Manager’s Gender Decreased Unchanged Increased Total 
     
Female 81 873 1,213 2,167 
Male 785 7,570 9,252 17,607 
     
Total    19,774 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Variables Observations Mean Median St. Dev. p1 p99 
       
Dependent variables       
Change in the level of interest rates 19,969 2.317 2.000 0.748 1.000 3.000 
Change in the level of the cost of financing 19,774 2.485 3.000 0.581 1.000 3.000 
Gender dummies       
Female 19,969 0.110 0.000 0.312 0.000 1.000 
Male-to-Female  5,915  0.033 0.000 0.179 0.000 1.000 
Female-to-Male  5,915  0.034 0.000 0.182 0.000 1.000 
Controls for firm quality       
Leverage up 19,969 0.328 0.000 0.469 0.000 1.000 
Leverage down 19,969 0.282 0.000 0.450 0.000 1.000 
Profit up 19,969 0.240 0.000 0.427 0.000 1.000 
Profit down 19,969 0.501 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Creditworthiness up 19,969 0.237 0.000 0.426 0.000 1.000 
Creditworthiness down 19,969 0.214 0.000 0.410 0.000 1.000 
Controls for the non-price conditions of the bank financing     
Maturity up  19,969  0.080 0.000 0.271 0.000 1.000 
Maturity down  19,969  0.095 0.000 0.293 0.000 1.000 
Collateral up  19,969  0.366 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
Collateral down  19,969  0.030 0.000 0.170 0.000 1.000 
Additional firm controls       
Micro 19,969 0.259 0.000 0.438 0.000 1.000 
Small 19,969 0.344 0.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 
Medium 19,969 0.302 0.000 0.459 0.000 1.000 
Very recent 19,969 0.015 0.000 0.120 0.000 1.000 
Recent 19,969 0.060 0.000 0.238 0.000 1.000 
Old 19,969 0.119 0.000 0.324 0.000 1.000 
Construction 19,969 0.098 0.000 0.297 0.000 1.000 
Manufacturing 19,969 0.243 0.000 0.429 0.000 1.000 
Wholesale/Retail 19,969 0.296 0.000 0.457 0.000 1.000 
Public support up 19,969 0.049 0.000 0.215 0.000 1.000 
Public support down 19,969 0.275 0.000 0.447 0.000 1.000 
Country level controls       
GDP Growth 19,969 -0.212 0.300 2.553 -8.200 5.050 
Inflation 19,969 1.830 1.950 1.133 -0.900 4.900 
Unemployment 19,969 12.170 9.800 6.494 4.700 27.400 
Concentration 19,969 0.076 0.057 0.064 0.021 0.355 
BLS 19,969 9.053 5.000 15.288 -6.000 85.000 
Cost of borrowing 19,969 -0.100 -0.043 0.877 -2.947 1.323 
Cooperatives 19,969 23.930 20.600 18.501 0.000 60.300 
NPL ratio 19,969 7.426 4.495 5.940 0.500 31.899 
 
 
Table 4: The impact of gender on changes in price terms and conditions of bank financing 
This table reports ordered logit (Columns 1-2; 4-5) and IV two-stage least squares (Columns 3 and 6) regressions concerning the impact of 
gender on changes in interest rates and other costs than interest rates. The estimation period is July 1, 2009 – March 31, 2014 (from the 2nd 
to the 10th of the SAFE waves). The dependent variables – which are also described in Section 2.2 – are ordinal variables that equal 1/2/3 
if the price terms and conditions (experienced by each firm) decreased/remained unchanged/increased during the past six months, 
respectively. Female is a dummy that equals one if the firm’s owner/director/CEO is female, and zero otherwise. See Table A1 in the 
Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the 
population. Additionally, all regressions include time and country dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the 
country level, appear in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not reported. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, 
and * at the 10% level.  
  Change in the level of interest rates  Change in the level of other costs than interest rates 
 O. Logit O. Logit IV  O. Logit O. Logit IV 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Female 0.105** 0.128* 3.070***  0.167*** 0.182*** 0.915** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.89)  (0.05) (0.03) (0.43) 
Profit up 0.018 0.027 0.010  -0.113** -0.108* 0.006 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.03)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) 
Female * Profit up  -0.098    -0.064  
  (0.21)    (0.16)  
Profit down 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.059**  0.075 0.075 0.052*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) 
Leverage up 0.132* 0.132* 0.048*  0.135*** 0.135*** 0.028** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) 
Leverage down -0.042 -0.042 0.004  -0.100** -0.100** -0.022 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Creditworthiness up -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.051*  -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.019 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Creditworthiness down 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.087***  0.238*** 0.238*** 0.069*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) 
Maturity up -0.081 -0.081 0.006  0.154 0.154 0.039* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.04)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.02) 
Maturity down 0.360*** 0.361*** 0.031  0.464** 0.464** 0.052*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.04)  (0.19) (0.19) (0.02) 
Collateral up 0.673*** 0.673*** 0.248***  0.989*** 0.989*** 0.242*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Collateral down -0.672*** -0.673*** -0.101  -0.869*** -0.869*** -0.124*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.07)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.04) 
Micro -0.013 -0.013 -0.247***  0.316 0.316 -0.026 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.08)  (0.19) (0.19) (0.04) 
Small 0.016 0.017 -0.075**  0.210* 0.211* 0.000 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.02) 
Medium -0.036 -0.035   0.098* 0.098*  
 (0.06) (0.06)   (0.05) (0.05)  
Very recent 0.234 0.235 -0.027  -0.379*** -0.377*** -0.096** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.10)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) 
Recent -0.111** -0.110** -0.148**  -0.171 -0.171 -0.068** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.03) 
Old -0.009 -0.009 -0.041  -0.111 -0.110 -0.038** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) 
Construction 0.021 0.021 0.031  0.068 0.068 0.020 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.02) 
Manufacturing -0.077** -0.077** -0.178***  0.053 0.053 -0.034 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Wholesale/Retail -0.025 -0.025 -0.183***  0.065 0.065 -0.035 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) 
GDP Growth 0.016 0.016 0.007  -0.048** -0.048** -0.009* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Inflation 0.156* 0.155* 0.084***  0.100 0.100 0.036*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.02)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) 
Unemployment 0.095** 0.095** 0.024**  0.043*** 0.043*** 0.009* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Concentration -17.146** -17.125** -4.142**  -5.581 -5.570 -2.035*** 
 (8.39) (8.40) (1.68)  (3.89) (3.90) (0.78) 
BLS 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.005 0.005 0.001** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cost of borrowing 0.742*** 0.743*** 0.077***  0.413** 0.414** 0.031** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.03)  (0.17) (0.17) (0.01) 
Cooperatives -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.025***  0.001 0.001 -0.003* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NPL ratio 0.043 0.043 0.004  0.043*** 0.043*** 0.007* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Observations 19,969 19,969 18,080  19,774 19,774 17,888 
Pseudo-R squared 0.154 0.154   0.156 0.156  
Time dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
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Table 5: The impact of gender on changes in price terms and conditions of bank financing – controlling for public support 
This table reports ordered logit (Columns 1-2; 4-5) and IV two-stage least squares (Columns 3 and 6) regressions concerning the impact of 
gender on changes in interest rates and other costs than interest rates. The estimation period is July 1, 2009 – March 31, 2014 (from the 2nd 
to the 10th of the SAFE waves). The dependent variables – which are also described in Section 2.2 – are ordinal variables that equal 1/2/3 
if the price terms and conditions (experienced by each firm) decreased/remained unchanged/increased during the past six months, 
respectively. Female is a dummy that equals one if the firm’s owner/director/CEO is female, and zero otherwise. See Table A1 in the 
Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the 
population. Additionally, all regressions include time and country dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the 
country level, appear in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not reported. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, 
and * at the 10% level. 
 Change in the level of interest rates  Change in the level of other costs than interest 
rates 
 O. Logit O. Logit IV  O. Logit O. Logit IV 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Female 0.135** 0.156** 3.091***  0.121** 0.142*** 0.939** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.89)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.43) 
Profit up -0.007 0.005 0.012  0.025 0.038 0.009 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.03)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) 
Female * Profit up  -0.093    -0.101  
  (0.13)    (0.17)  
Profit down 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.058**  0.200** 0.200** 0.049*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) 
Leverage up 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.047*  0.124 0.124 0.027** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.01) 
Leverage down -0.049* -0.049* 0.003  -0.114** -0.114*** -0.025* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Creditworthiness up -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.049  -0.021 -0.021 -0.014 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) 
Creditworthiness down 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.083***  0.295*** 0.295*** 0.062*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Maturity up -0.065 -0.065 0.008  0.208 0.208 0.043* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.04)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.02) 
Maturity down 0.211** 0.212*** 0.029  0.309*** 0.310*** 0.048** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) 
Collateral up 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.241***  0.958*** 0.959*** 0.230*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Collateral down -0.593*** -0.594*** -0.102  -0.533*** -0.534*** -0.125*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.07)  (0.13) (0.14) (0.04) 
Micro -0.005 -0.005 -0.250***  0.201 0.201 -0.031 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.08)  (0.16) (0.16) (0.04) 
Small 0.042 0.042 -0.076**  0.106 0.106 -0.002 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) 
Very recent 0.224 0.226 -0.027  -0.290** -0.287** -0.097** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.10)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.05) 
Recent -0.020 -0.020 -0.149**  -0.113 -0.113 -0.070** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.03) 
Old 0.039 0.039 -0.042  -0.108* -0.108* -0.040** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) 
Construction 0.024 0.024 0.030  0.057 0.058 0.018 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.02) 
Manufacturing -0.076** -0.076** -0.180***  0.048 0.048 -0.037 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
Wholesale/Retail -0.031 -0.030 -0.185***  0.052 0.053 -0.038 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) 
Public support up -0.208** -0.208** -0.037  -0.266** -0.266** -0.064** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.05)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.03) 
Public support down 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.041  0.387*** 0.388*** 0.071*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) 
GDP Growth 0.038 0.038 0.006  -0.028 -0.028 -0.009* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Inflation 0.151 0.151 0.082***  0.103*** 0.103*** 0.033*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Unemployment 0.067 0.067 0.024**  0.014 0.013 0.008 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Concentration -13.967* -13.919* -4.135**  -6.541 -6.493 -2.005** 
 (7.78) (7.79) (1.69)  (4.90) (4.91) (0.78) 
BLS -0.002 -0.002 0.001  0.004 0.004 0.001** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cost of borrowing 0.855*** 0.856*** 0.078***  0.453*** 0.455*** 0.032** 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.03)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.01) 
Cooperatives -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.025***  -0.001 -0.001 -0.004** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NPL ratio 0.067* 0.067* 0.004  0.061** 0.060** 0.008* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Observations 18,080 18,080 18,080  17,888 17,888 17,888 
Pseudo-R squared 0.160 0.160   0.155 0.155  
Time dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
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Table 6: The impact of gender on changes in price terms and conditions of bank financing – financially autonomous firms only 
This table reports ordered logit (Columns 1-2; 4-5) and IV two-stage least squares (Columns 3 and 6) regressions concerning the impact of 
gender on changes in interest rates and other costs than interest rates. The estimation period is July 1, 2009 – March 31, 2014 (from the 2nd 
to the 10th of the SAFE waves). The dependent variables – which are also described in Section 2.2 – are ordinal variables that equal 1/2/3 
if the price terms and conditions (experienced by each firm) decreased/remained unchanged/increased during the past six months, 
respectively. Female is a dummy that equals one if the firm’s owner/director/CEO is female, and zero otherwise. See Table A1 in the 
Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the 
population. Additionally, all regressions include time and country dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the 
country level, appear in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not reported. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, 
and * at the 10% level. 
 Change in the level of interest rates  Change in the level of other costs than interest 
rates 
 O. Logit O. Logit IV  O. Logit O. Logit IV 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Female 0.138** 0.161** 3.377***  0.111** 0.134** 0.869** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (1.01)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.44) 
Profit up 0.006 0.020 0.012  0.042 0.056 0.010 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) 
Female * Profit up  -0.107    -0.110  
  (0.13)    (0.18)  
Profit down 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.062*  0.205** 0.205** 0.049*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.01) 
Leverage up 0.141** 0.141** 0.031  0.121 0.121 0.023* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) 
Leverage down -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.011  -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.029** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Creditworthiness up -0.134** -0.134** -0.039  -0.020 -0.020 -0.014 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) 
Creditworthiness down 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.094***  0.306*** 0.306*** 0.066*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Maturity up -0.067 -0.067 0.019  0.181 0.181 0.036 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.05)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.02) 
Maturity down 0.186** 0.188** 0.017  0.310*** 0.311*** 0.045** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) 
Collateral up 0.691*** 0.691*** 0.246***  0.956*** 0.957*** 0.227*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Collateral down -0.623*** -0.623*** -0.105  -0.556*** -0.557*** -0.136*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.07)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.04) 
Micro -0.012 -0.012 -0.260***  0.201 0.200 -0.022 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.08)  (0.17) (0.17) (0.04) 
Small 0.029 0.030 -0.078**  0.094 0.095 -0.000 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) 
Very recent 0.237* 0.239* -0.036  -0.284** -0.282** -0.093* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.05) 
Recent -0.046 -0.046 -0.185**  -0.095 -0.095 -0.064** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.03) 
Old 0.046 0.046 -0.063  -0.098 -0.098 -0.040** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) 
Construction 0.020 0.021 0.035  0.044 0.045 0.015 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) 
Manufacturing -0.085 -0.085 -0.208***  0.034 0.034 -0.040 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Wholesale/Retail -0.034 -0.033 -0.207***  0.035 0.036 -0.040 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
Public support up -0.219* -0.219* 0.006  -0.325** -0.325** -0.069** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.06)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.03) 
Public support down 0.322*** 0.323*** 0.048  0.377*** 0.377*** 0.072*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) 
GDP Growth 0.048 0.048 0.008  -0.026 -0.027 -0.007 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Inflation 0.153 0.152 0.087***  0.125*** 0.124*** 0.034*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Unemployment 0.062 0.062 0.030**  0.013 0.013 0.009 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Concentration -15.537* -15.476* -5.009***  -7.119 -7.064 -2.278*** 
 (7.96) (7.96) (1.92)  (5.27) (5.28) (0.82) 
BLS -0.002 -0.002 0.001  0.004 0.004 0.001** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cost of borrowing 0.892*** 0.894*** 0.072**  0.415*** 0.417*** 0.028** 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.03)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.01) 
Cooperatives -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.027***  0.000 0.000 -0.003* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NPL ratio 0.074* 0.074* 0.002  0.062** 0.062** 0.008* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) 
Observations 16,700 16,700 16,700  16,528 16,528 16,528 
Pseudo-R squared 0.164 0.164   0.154 0.154  
Time dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
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Table 7: The impact of gender on changes in interest rates – exploring country and “time” heterogeneity 
This table reports ordered logit regressions concerning the impact of gender on changes in interest rates. The dependent variable – which 
is also described in Section 2.2 – is an ordinal variable that equals 1/2/3 if the level of interest rates (experienced by each firm) 
decreased/remained unchanged/increased during the past six months, respectively. Female is a dummy that equals one if the firm’s 
owner/director/CEO is female, and zero otherwise. See Table A1 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions 
use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Additionally, all regressions include time and country 
dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, appear in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not 
reported. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 Change in the level of interest rates 
 Country heterogeneity  Time heterogeneity 
 GR, IT, PT AT, BE, DE, NL FI, IE  Sovereign Crisis Post-OMT 
announcement 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
       
Female 0.224** 0.196*** -0.057  0.193** 0.153*** 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.44)  (0.09) (0.04) 
dy/dx (when Y = increased) 4.9% 3.3%   4.7% 3.6% 
dy/dx (when Y = decreased) –1.0% –3.6%   –1.3% –1.9% 
       
Profit up 0.067 -0.089*** -0.164  0.005 -0.046 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.21)  (0.06) (0.05) 
Profit down 0.244*** 0.178*** -0.003  0.174*** 0.196*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.18)  (0.03) (0.06) 
Leverage up 0.300*** 0.023 0.276**  0.205*** 0.111 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.13)  (0.07) (0.09) 
Leverage down -0.010 -0.058 -0.099  0.009 -0.113 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.22)  (0.03) (0.10) 
Creditworthiness up -0.207*** -0.182*** 0.173  -0.118** -0.121 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.33)  (0.06) (0.10) 
Creditworthiness down 0.273*** 0.234*** 0.116***  0.155*** 0.364*** 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.11) 
Maturity up -0.048 -0.381*** 0.327  0.176* -0.334 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.33)  (0.09) (0.29) 
Maturity down 0.289** 0.334** -0.284  0.155 0.344** 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.39)  (0.13) (0.16) 
Collateral up 0.731*** 0.526*** 0.832***  0.756*** 0.599*** 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.26)  (0.07) (0.11) 
Collateral down -0.278* -0.611*** -0.432  -0.608*** -0.447*** 
 (0.16) (0.10) (0.46)  (0.21) (0.11) 
Micro -0.187*** 0.182*** -0.166  -0.269*** 0.205 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.40)  (0.09) (0.13) 
Small -0.028 0.092*** -0.419***  -0.123** 0.172** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.10)  (0.06) (0.07) 
Very recent 0.645* 0.232** -0.382  -0.091 0.328 
 (0.33) (0.11) (0.62)  (0.22) (0.30) 
Recent -0.162* 0.255*** -0.042  -0.067 -0.116* 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.10)  (0.13) (0.06) 
Old 0.148*** 0.208** -0.201***  -0.070 0.005 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.11) 
Construction 0.139*** 0.031 0.027***  -0.067 0.137 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)  (0.05) (0.14) 
Manufacturing -0.063*** -0.168*** -0.010  0.001 -0.113** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.05) 
Wholesale/Retail -0.050 -0.037 -0.082  0.078** -0.105** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.04) 
Public support up -0.018 -0.303*** -0.248***  -0.292 -0.076 
 (0.40) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.19) (0.23) 
Public support down 0.272*** 0.277*** 0.439**  0.363*** 0.206** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.21)  (0.07) (0.09) 
GDP Growth 0.034 0.022 -0.007  0.253** -0.317*** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.02)  (0.11) (0.06) 
Inflation -0.042 0.648*** -0.326**  0.053 0.447*** 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.17)  (0.05) (0.07) 
Unemployment -0.017 0.154** 0.313***  0.093 -0.251*** 
 (0.13) (0.07) (0.03)  (0.12) (0.09) 
Concentration 15.051* 15.371 -33.993***  0.514 7.590 
 (9.10) (14.71) (3.63)  (15.12) (11.67) 
BLS -0.007 -0.014*** 0.065***  -0.011 -0.015*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.00) 
Cost of borrowing 0.819 -0.421 -0.393  1.365*** 0.772*** 
 (0.73) (0.79) (0.26)  (0.46) (0.25) 
Cooperatives -0.215** 0.536*** -0.102***  -0.158 -0.039 
 (0.09) (0.19) (0.01)  (0.17) (0.10) 
NPL ratio -0.118 1.324*** 0.126***  -0.073 0.094 
 (0.12) (0.38) (0.02)  (0.10) (0.12) 
Observations 5,110 4,937 1,552  5,918 6,607 
Pseudo-R squared 0.101 0.078 0.079  0.130 0.164 
Time dummies YES YES YES  YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES  YES YES 
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Table 8: The impact of a change in the leadership on changes in price terms and conditions of the bank financing 
This table reports panel ordered logit regressions concerning the impact of a change in the leadership on price terms and conditions of the 
bank financing. The estimation period is July 1, 2009 – March 31, 2014 (from the 2nd to the 10th of the SAFE waves). The dependent 
variables – which are also described in Section 2.2 – are ordinal variables that equal 1/2/3 if the price terms and conditions (experienced by 
each firm) decreased/remained unchanged/increased during the past six months, respectively. Male-to-Female (Female-to-Male) is a 
dummy that equals one if a firm experienced a change in leadership, i.e. from a male to a female (from a female to a male) 
owner/director/CEO. See Table A1 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions include time and country 
dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, appear in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not 
reported. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 Change in the level of interest rates  Change in the level of other costs than interest rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Male-to-Female -0.047 -0.041 -0.020   -0.057 -0.043 -0.040  
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)   (0.17) (0.18) (0.17)  
Female-to-Male -0.303** -0.304**  -0.301**  -0.050 -0.052  -0.049 
 (0.15) (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.25) (0.24)  (0.24) 
Profit up -0.009 0.008 0.007 0.008  -0.136 -0.128 -0.128 -0.127 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Profit down 0.316*** 0.299*** 0.297*** 0.300***  0.232* 0.216* 0.216* 0.216* 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Leverage up 0.193*** 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.196***  0.110 0.107 0.107 0.107 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Leverage down -0.016 -0.023 -0.021 -0.023  -0.046 -0.056 -0.055 -0.056 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Creditworthiness up -0.218** -0.193** -0.193** -0.193**  -0.077 -0.062 -0.062 -0.062 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Creditworthiness down 0.176*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 0.135***  0.179 0.139 0.139 0.139 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Maturity up -0.010 -0.002 0.001 -0.003  0.474*** 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.468*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Maturity down 0.329** 0.325** 0.327** 0.324**  0.446** 0.435** 0.435** 0.435** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Collateral up 0.801*** 0.750*** 0.748*** 0.750***  1.201*** 1.143*** 1.143*** 1.143*** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Collateral down -0.688*** -0.703*** -0.697*** -0.703***  -0.684*** -0.723*** -0.722*** -0.722*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)  (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Micro 0.082 0.065 0.059 0.064  0.329* 0.312* 0.312* 0.311* 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Small 0.146 0.144 0.139 0.143  0.140 0.134 0.134 0.133 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Medium 0.038 0.038 0.035 0.037  0.041 0.035 0.034 0.034 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Very recent -0.408 -0.418 -0.417 -0.420  -0.540** -0.551** -0.550** -0.553** 
 (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29)  (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Recent 0.097 0.098 0.103 0.098  0.010 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Old -0.113 -0.116 -0.113 -0.115  -0.179 -0.181 -0.181 -0.180 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Construction 0.037 0.034 0.036 0.035  0.176 0.170 0.169 0.170 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Manufacturing -0.119 -0.131 -0.134 -0.131  0.161* 0.154 0.154 0.154 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)  (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Wholesale/Retail -0.086 -0.096 -0.097 -0.096  0.058 0.051 0.051 0.051 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
Public support up  -0.285 -0.284 -0.284   0.016 0.016 0.016 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)   (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
Public support down  0.338*** 0.337*** 0.338***   0.389*** 0.389*** 0.389*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)   (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Δ GDP Growth 0.015 0.011 0.012 0.011  0.035 0.031 0.031 0.031 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Δ Inflation 0.193 0.176 0.179 0.177  -0.052 -0.066 -0.065 -0.065 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Δ Unemployment 0.315*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.300***  0.353*** 0.337*** 0.337*** 0.337*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Δ Concentration -5.883 -6.117 -6.325 -6.182  3.612 3.181 3.145 3.128 
 (5.71) (5.92) (5.80) (5.89)  (5.85) (6.09) (6.13) (6.13) 
Δ BLS 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Δ Cost of borrowing -0.523* -0.503* -0.505* -0.503*  -0.134 -0.113 -0.114 -0.113 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)  (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Δ Cooperatives -0.029** -0.031** -0.031** -0.031**  -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Δ NPL ratio 0.014 0.011 0.013 0.011  -0.045 -0.048 -0.048 -0.048 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 5,915 5,915 5,915 5,915  5,878 5,878 5,878 5,878 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
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Table 9: The impact of a change in the leadership on changes in interest rates – System-GMM regressions 
This table reports two-step system GMM regressions (after augmenting the main regression with a lagged dependent variable) concerning 
the impact of a change in the leadership on changes in interest rates. The estimation period is July 1, 2009 – March 31, 2014 (from the 2nd 
to the 10th of the SAFE waves). The dependent variable – which is also described in Section 2.2 – is an ordinal variable that equals 1/2/3 
if the level of interest rates (experienced by each firm) decreased/remained unchanged/increased during the past six months, respectively. 
Male-to-Female (Female-to-Male) is a dummy that equals one if a firm experienced a change in leadership, i.e. from a male to a female 
(from a female to a male) owner/director/CEO. See Table A1 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions 
include time and country dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not 
reported. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 Change in the level of interest rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Male-to-Female 0.027 0.040 0.047*  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
Female-to-Male -0.066** -0.067**  -0.074** 
 (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) 
Profit up -0.044** -0.049*** -0.052** -0.054*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Profit down 0.034* 0.036* 0.040* 0.041* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Leverage up 0.026* 0.021 0.030* 0.013 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Leverage down -0.042** -0.039** -0.034* -0.037* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Creditworthiness up -0.016 -0.019 -0.025 -0.018 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Creditworthiness down 0.031* 0.021 0.014 0.022 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Maturity up 0.089*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Maturity down 0.013 0.016 0.018 0.024 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Collateral up 0.115*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Collateral down -0.188*** -0.198*** -0.201*** -0.219*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Micro 2.930*** 2.842*** 2.199*** 0.003 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.10) (0.06) 
Small 2.924*** 2.835*** 2.187*** 0.004 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.09) (0.06) 
Medium 2.929*** 2.860*** 2.204*** 0.033 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.09) (0.05) 
Large 2.871*** 2.812*** 2.177*** 0.000 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.10) (0.00) 
Very recent -0.164 -0.155 -0.167* -0.149 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Recent 0.124*** 0.139*** 0.136*** 0.132*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Old -0.041 -0.036 -0.037 -0.034 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Construction 0.184*** 0.174*** 0.155*** 0.186*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Manufacturing 0.046 0.037 0.035 0.042 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Wholesale/Retail 0.101*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Public support up  0.135*** 0.135*** 0.164*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Public support down  0.083*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Δ GDP Growth -0.006 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Δ Inflation 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Δ Unemployment 0.112*** 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.104*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Δ Concentration -2.617*** -2.189** -2.450** -2.462** 
 (0.98) (0.98) (1.01) (1.00) 
Δ BLS 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Δ Cost of borrowing -0.242*** -0.251*** -0.247*** -0.243*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Δ Cooperatives -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Δ NPL ratio 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,554 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test – p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AR(2) test – p-value 0.990 0.995 0.997 0.952 
Hansen test – p-value 0.834 0.819 0.768 0.740 
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Appendix  
Table A1: Variable descriptions and sources 
Variables Description Source 
Dependent variables   
Change in the level of interest rates Ordinal variable that equals one/two/three if the level of interest rates – experienced by each firm – decreased/remained unchanged/increased during the past six months, respectively. ECB: SAFE 
Change in the level of the cost of financing 
Ordinal variable that equals one/two/three if the level of the cost of financing (other than interest rates) – experienced by each firm – decreased/remained unchanged/increased 
during the past six months, respectively. 
ECB: SAFE 
Gender dummies   
Female Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s owner/director/CEO is female, and zero otherwise. ECB: SAFE 
Male-to-Female Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a change in the leadership (from a male to a female owner/director/CEO).  ECB: SAFE 
Female-to-Male Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a change in the leadership (from a female to a male owner/director/CEO). ECB: SAFE 
Controls for firm quality   
Leverage up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced an increase in the debt-to-assets ratio in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Leverage down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a decrease in the debt-to-assets ratio in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Profit up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced an increase in net income after taxes in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Profit down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a decrease in net income after taxes in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Creditworthiness up Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s credit history improved in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Creditworthiness down Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s credit history deteriorated in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Controls for the non-price conditions of the bank financing  
Maturity up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced an increase in the available maturity of the loan in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Maturity down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a decrease in the available maturity of the loan in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Collateral up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced an increase in the collateral requirements in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Collateral down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a decrease in the collateral requirements in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Additional firm controls   
Micro Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has between 1 and 9 employees. ECB: SAFE 
Small Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has between 10 and 49 employees. ECB: SAFE 
Medium Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has between 50 and 249 employees. ECB: SAFE 
Very recent Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is less than 2 years old. ECB: SAFE 
Recent Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is between 2 and 5 years old. ECB: SAFE 
Old Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is between 5 and 10 years old. ECB: SAFE 
Construction Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s main activity is construction. ECB: SAFE 
Manufacturing Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s main activity is manufacturing. ECB: SAFE 
Wholesale/Retail Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s main activity is wholesale or retail trade. ECB: SAFE 
Not fully autonomous Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is part of a profit-oriented enterprise, not taking fully autonomous financial decisions. ECB: SAFE 
Autonomous Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is an autonomous profit-oriented enterprise, making independent financial decisions. ECB: SAFE 
Public support up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced an improvement in access to public financial support in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Public support down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a deterioration in access to public financial support in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Country level controls   
GDP Growth The annual growth rate of real GDP based on averages of quarterly data for each survey round. OECD 
Inflation The annual inflation rate based on averages of quarterly data for each survey round. OECD 
Unemployment The annual unemployment rate based on averages of quarterly data for each survey round. Eurostat 
Concentration The Herfindahl Index (HI) of total assets concentration (for the banking sector). ECB: Data Warehouse 
BLS The bank credit standards (in the previous three months) based on averages of quarterly data for each survey round. ECB: BLS 
Cost of borrowing The annual change in the cost of borrowing for loans to non-financial firms. ECB: Data Warehouse 
Cooperatives The market share of cooperative banks. 
European Association of 
Co-operative Banks 
NPL ratio The ratio of bank non-performing loans over total gross loans. World Bank 
Instrumental variable   
Share of female employment The share of female employment based on averages of quarterly data for each survey round. Eurostat 
Variable for the cross-country test   
GGGI An index designed to measure a country’s gender equality. World Economic Forum 
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